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Abstract
Rumination is a process of uncontrolled, narrowly focused negative thinking that is often self-referen-
tial, and that is a hallmark of depression. Despite its importance, little is known about its cognitive mech-
anisms. Rumination can be thought of as a specific, constrained form of mind-wandering. Here, we
introduce a cognitive model of rumination that we developed on the basis of our existing model of mind-
wandering. The rumination model implements the hypothesis that rumination is caused by maladaptive
habits of thought. These habits of thought are modeled by adjusting the number of memory chunks and
their associative structure, which changes the sequence of memories that are retrieved during mind-wan-
dering, such that during rumination the same set of negative memories is retrieved repeatedly. The imple-
mentation of habits of thought was guided by empirical data from an experience sampling study in
healthy and depressed participants. On the basis of this empirically derived memory structure, our model
naturally predicts the declines in cognitive task performance that are typically observed in depressed
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patients. This study demonstrates how we can use cognitive models to better understand the cognitive
mechanisms underlying rumination and depression.
Keywords: Mind-wandering; Rumination; Associative memory; Depression; Sustained attention
1. Introduction
Rumination is the process of narrowly focused uncontrolled repetitive negative
thinking—mostly self-referential—that lies at the core of depression (Marchetti, Koster,
Klinger, & Alloy, 2016; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Despite the serious clinical consequences of this process, there
is to date no coherent computational cognitive theory that describes it. While there are
several verbal theories (Marchetti et al., 2016), those can only explain their own limited
set of experiments and cannot make quantitative predictions.
To develop a theory of rumination, we built on recent research and modeling of mind-
wandering, because rumination can be thought of as a highly constrained form of mind-
wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016). Mind-wandering is
a process of task-unrelated thinking that takes up approximately 50% of our waking time
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), and it can sometimes help
and sometimes hinder performance. For example, in undemanding contexts, mind-wander-
ing can serve useful functions for creativity (Baird et al., 2012) and planning (Baird,
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). On the other hand, it disrupts performance when it takes
away cognitive resources that are needed to perform the task, and this occurs in particular
when mind-wandering is unintentional and uncontrolled (Ottaviani, Medea, Lonigro,
Tarvainen, & Couyoumdjian, 2015; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016), as is the case
with rumination. This could explain why people that suffer from rumination typically also
report having difficulties concentrating (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003). In addition,
this could explain why depressed people reported higher levels of off-task thinking and
especially higher levels of negative-valence thought in a simple choice response time task
(Hoffmann, Banzhaf, Kanske, Bermpohl, & Singer, 2016).
So far, the theories of rumination can be broadly divided into three classes (that are not
mutually exclusive). One class of theories suggests that rumination arises from an increased
bias toward negatively valenced information (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990). When attention is
focused more on negative information, this reduces people’s ability to focus on other things
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Another class of theories instead focuses on inhibition and sug-
gests that the primary deficit underlying rumination is an inability to disengage from infor-
mation, in particular when this information is negative and self-focused (Whitmer &
Banich, 2007, 2010). The third theory of rumination—which we refer to as “habits of
thought”—focuses not on control processes such as attention and inhibition, but rather on
the content of thoughts during mind-wandering. Patterns of memory associations that are
frequently rehearsed can become something like an attractor (Cramer et al., 2016), and
therefore will be replayed any moment there is time for mind-wandering.
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To start to distinguish between these different theories of rumination, it is helpful to
specify them in more detail by implementing them as a computational model in a cogni-
tive architecture, and to simulate their predictions for performance on a simple sustained
attention task. A well-suited cognitive architecture for implementing such theories is
Adaptive Control of Thought - Rational (ACT-R; Anderson, 2007; Anderson, Fincham,
Qin, & Stocco, 2008). The advantage of ACT-R is that it is capable of simulating com-
plete tasks from stimulus to response.
To implement our theory of rumination, we will make use of our recent computational
model of mind-wandering (Taatgen, van Vugt, Daamen, Katidioti, & Borst, submitted;
van Vugt, Taatgen, Bastian, & Sackur, 2015). This model frames mind-wandering in
terms of resource competition, in which task goals compete with mind-wandering goals,
and mind-wandering occurs when that goal wins the competition. The mind-wandering
process itself is modeled as a process of memory retrieval. While memory retrieval is not
the only cognitive process that takes place during mind-wandering (mind-wandering
could, for example, also involve the replaying of visual stimuli), still mind-wandering
most often involves the replay and preplay of episodic memories (Christoff, Gordon, &
Smith, 2011). In addition, mind-wandering involves activation of the medial temporal
lobe sub-system of the default mode network, a brain network that has been associated
with memory retrieval (Christoff et al., 2016; Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, &
Christoff, 2015).
Given the important role of memory retrieval in our mind-wandering model, it is
uniquely suited for implementing the third theory of rumination, which says that rumina-
tion is driven by the existence of thought habits that are maladaptive. We hypothesize
that these thought patterns are what cause people to get caught in a funnel of repetitive
negative thinking and disconnect from the current task, which leads to the perceived
problems in concentration. Based on this, we predict that a model of rumination with
exactly the same production rules but a different memory chunk structure should perform
worse on a sustained attention task than a “healthy model.” Future work should imple-
ment the other two theories of rumination and examine how their predictions may differ.
2. Methods
2.1. Mind-wandering model
We implemented our mind-wandering model (which forms the basis for the rumination
model) in the ACT-R architecture (Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008). ACT-R is a
cognitive architecture that has been used to predict task performance in a range of para-
digms such as free recall (Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998)), multitasking
(Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008), and driving a car (Salvucci & Macuga, 2002). Models in this
cognitive architecture consist of production rules: if-then statements that describe under
what conditions, what information is transferred between the different cognitive resources
(vision, motor, working memory, etc.) of the model. For example, a production may say
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the equivalent of “when a visual stimulus appears, send a signal to the memory module
to find out its identity.” The execution of each of these productions takes a certain
amount of time, and the sum of these times is the response time produced by the partici-
pant. The model is then given the same task as the human participant, and its produced
responses and response times are compared to those produced by the human participant.
The set of production rules used for a particular model is first determined by a detailed
analysis of the task at hand, and second by seeing what rules can together predict behav-
ior satisfactorily. In addition to these production rules, ACT-R has a number of subsym-
bolic parameters that govern things such as noise in various processes and the speed of
memory decay. These parameters are left as much as possible at their default values
(model parameters that we did not leave at their defaults are mentioned in the Appendix).
The most important module of ACT-R for the purposes of our model is the memory
module (named the “declarative module”). This module describes how memories are
stored and retrieved. Each memory “chunk” has an activation that determines how likely
it is to be retrieved, and how long that takes (the more active a memory, the faster it can
be retrieved). The activation of each memory depends on two components: how often
and how recently a memory has been retrieved, as well as activation that spreads from
other, related memories (Anderson, 1983; Salvucci & Macuga, 2002). This spreading acti-
vation is mediated through the attributes of chunks. More concretely, in the context of
our model, such attributes are the mood associated with each memory (to facilitate com-
parison with behavioral data [see below], those moods are cheerful, content, down, suspi-
cious, and insecure [Wigman et al., 2015]). The specific moods in that study were chosen
because they maximally differentiated between control, depressed, and psychotic patients.
We decided to keep these moods merely as symbolic attributes instead of modeling them
physiologically (Dancy, 2013; Dancy, Ritter, Berry, & Klein, 2015) to keep the model as
simple as possible.
Our mind-wandering model rests on two basic assumptions: first, that there is a
continuous competition between a mind-wandering and a task process, and consequently,
mind-wandering is likely to kick in when there is a spare moment in the task; and
second, that mind-wandering is primarily a process of memory retrieval (van Vugt et al.,
2015; Taatgen et al., submitted) implemented as retrieving chunks from declarative mem-
ory. As is usual in ACT-R’s memory retrieval, the most active chunk is the one that will
be retrieved by the declarative module. Each chunk’s activation is determined by three
factors: the amount of recent use (more recent and more frequent use imply a larger
chunk activation), the spreading activation from other chunks, and random activation












WkjSji þ i ð1Þ
This equation sums over all the previous times t the memory chunk has been retrieved,
discounted by the decay parameter d. Each chunk also has a fixed-level activation b,
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independent of how often it has been retrieved. To this is added the activation spreading
through other chunks in buffers weighted by weights Wk from each buffer k, which is
multiplied by the strength of association Sji. Only memory chunks whose activation
exceeds the retrieval threshold can be retrieved from declarative memory.
Since each chunk has a slot containing its emotional valence, the spreading activation
from the imaginal buffer (in which an item is placed after retrieval) ensures that chunks
with the same emotional valence are more likely to follow each other than chunks with
different emotional valence, in line with previous empirical data (van Vugt, Shahar, &
Britton, 2012). This spreading activation could therefore be a good tool for creating the
funneling effect of negative self-referential thinking that is so characteristic of rumination
(Harel, Tennyson, Fava, & Bar, 2016).
The mind-wandering memory retrieval process continues until a specific memory
chunk that is retrieved reminds the model of its main task. Once the reminder of the main
task has been retrieved, the main goal switches from mind-wandering to being on-task.
During the period of mind-wandering, the declarative module is busy retrieving memo-
ries, which means that responses to incoming stimuli will be done in automatic mode by
giving the default response and will not involve memory retrievals. In addition, since
ongoing memory retrievals first have to be finished before a response is made, the mind-
wandering process may lead to an increase in the variability of response times during
mind-wandering, in line with behavioral findings (Bastian & Sackur, 2013; van Vugt &
Broers, 2016).
The mind-wandering model was given a sustained attention to response task—SART
(Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004) to produce testable predic-
tions for behavior. In this task, participants see a stream of digits, presented at a pace of
one per three seconds, and they press a button whenever a digit is presented, except when
it is the number three. The number three, the nogo stimulus, is presented on roughly 10%
of the trials. This means that when participants do not pay attention, they will revert to
an automatic mode of responding and fail to inhibit responses to the rare nogo stimuli.
2.2. Adaptations for modeling rumination
Our rumination model implemented the “habits of thought” theory of rumination. The
main idea underlying this theory is that rumination consists of a set of well-rehearsed
thought patterns made up of memory retrievals that are predominantly negative and self-
referential. We tried out different methods for generating strong loops of self-referential
negative thinking (funneling) by generating a population of models that varied either in
the number of chunks with different moods or in the strength of the connection between
these chunks and the memory chunk that reminds the participant of the main task. For
the number of chunks, we created models that had 1, 5, or 10 of each of the five moods
(cheerful, content, down, suspicious, and insecure), resulting in 35 = 243 different models.
Similarly, for the connection strengths (Sji) we tried values of 0.1, 0.5, and 1.0 for the
connection between each of the five moods and the return-to-task chunk (resulting in
another 243 different models). We found that the most effective way was to increase the
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number of chunks with negative valence, such that these negative-valence chunks are
more likely to be retrieved. In addition, our simulations demonstrated that the total num-
ber of chunks had a large influence on the model’s behavior, which meant it was crucial
that the rumination model and the control model had the same number of chunks.
On the basis of the simulations of this family of models, we decided on a final non-
depressed model has 55 chunks in total, 11 per mood (cheerful, content, down, insecure,
suspicious—these moods were derived from the empirical data described below). The
final depressed model also has 55 chunks, but those consist of 5 chunks of each of the
positive moods (cheerful and content) and 15 chunks of each of the negative moods
(down, insecure, and suspicious). For both models, the association strengths (Sji’s) were
0.1 between moods of the same valence, and 0.01 between moods of different valence.
These association strengths were chosen such that the spreading activations were roughly
balanced with the base level activations and slightly adjusted to better fit the empirical
data. Our rumination model differs from our previous mind-wandering model in that there
are two chunks that remind the user of the main task—one with positive and one with
negative valence—instead of just one with a positive valence as was the case in the
previous model. This allowed for the emergence of a symmetric positive and a negative-
valence mind-wandering network instead of biasing the model toward a positive
mind-wandering network.
To assess model performance, we simulated data for 100 participants suffering from
rumination and 100 participants with the usual model structure (i.e., without rumination).
We chose 100 participants because this is in the same ballpark as the empirical data. We
then measured how many chunks of each mood the model recalled during mind-wander-
ing episodes, together with their transition probabilities. These measures were compared
to the experience sampling data described below to adjust the model. Once the models’
memory structures were adjusted to exhibit thought contents similar to what was observed
in the experience sampling data, we made predictions for how rumination would impact
performance on a sustained attention task. The final model code and model outputs for
10 sample participants can be downloaded from http://www.ai.rug.nl/~mkvanvugt/depre
ssion_model_Maarten.zip.
2.3. Experience sampling data on depression
We configured the set of memory chunks and their associative structure on the basis of
an experience sampling study (Wigman et al., 2015). In experience sampling participants
are prompted several times a day to respond to a brief questionnaire about their thoughts
and experience. This particular study found that depressed patients had an increase in the
number of negative-valence thoughts, more difficulty concentrating, and most important,
a network of negative thoughts (specifically, suspicious, down, and insecure) that was
much more separate from the network of positive thoughts (content and cheerful) than in
the control subjects. The experience sampling data we used in this study were collapsed
across all participants in the depression and control groups. It contained data from 129
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depressed patients and 212 non-depressed controls, who were sampled 10 times per day
for a period of 5–6 days.
3. Results
3.1. Average thought frequencies
Rumination is associated with increased negative memories and an increased preva-
lence of negatively valenced thoughts. To examine whether our model could reproduce
those findings, we first compared the activation of positive-valence and negative-valence
chunks, as well as the frequency of retrieval of the different subcategories. A challenge
in this comparison is that the empirical data consist of the average rating of positive and
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Reported positive and negative effect. (a) This shows the frequency with which participants reported
experiencing particular degrees of positive and negative effect in the experience sampling data, while (b)
shows the summed activation of positive and negative chunks produced by the model (our closest proxy for
the continuous affect ratings in the empirical data).
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negative emotions on a 7-point Likert scale (the rating frequencies in the complete sam-
ple are shown in Fig. 1a). This rating has no direct correlate in the model. Since the judg-
ment is supposed to reflect a participant’s general mood, we used the summed activation
of all positive/negative chunks as a proxy for positive and negative effect, respectively.
We were able to reproduce an increase in the summed memory activation of negative
chunks and a decrease in the summed memory activation of positive chunks (Fig. 1b).
We then examined how frequently positive and negative memory chunks were retrieved
by healthy and depressed models. Fig. 2a shows that while the healthy model retrieves
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. The probability of memories being retrieved depends on their emotional valence. (a) The control
model retrieves every mood more or less equally often, while the depressed model preferentially retrieves
negatively-valenced items. (b) Empirical data show that depressed participants experienced each mood with
comparable intensity, while non-depressed controls displayed a bias toward positive moods. Error bars reflect
standard error of the mean.
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positive and negative valence equally frequently, the depressed model tends to retrieve
negative chunks more frequently (which then leads to a feedback loop, because these neg-
ative chunks then become more active, which makes it likely that they will be retrieved
even more often). The empirical data (Fig. 2b) are somewhat similar, although here it
appears as if healthy participants relatively suppress negative memory chunks. Note that
this is at odds with a substantial body of literature that reports a negativity bias for
depressed patients (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) instead of a positive facilitation in healthy
controls (but see Levens and Gotlib, 2010).
3.2. Transitions between moods
A unique feature of the data presented in Wigman et al. (2015) was that not just fre-
quencies of different types of thought were presented but also the network of the tran-
sitions between different moods. In the empirical work by Wigman et al., these
transitions were measured by fitting a multilevel linear mixed effect model to the data.
Each score at time t1 was used to predict the score at time point t, and this resulted
in a fixed-effect coefficient for each connection between moods. The differences in
magnitude of these coefficients between depressed and control participants are com-
pared in Fig. 3a. The largest difference between healthy and depressed participants that
our model needs to capture is a higher number of transitions between negative-valence
chunks for the depressed patients compared to controls, together with a lower number
of transitions between positive and negative valence chunks for depressed patients. As
before, we cannot produce exactly the same measure in our model, which retrieves one
memory chunk at a time. The closest approximation to the regression coefficients in
the empirical data is transition probabilities between retrieved memory chunks with
different moods. Fig. 3b shows that when we measure the transitions for the depressed
and control networks, we reproduce the somewhat stronger between-negative connec-
tivity and the somewhat weaker positive-to-negative connectivity for the depressed
model. With the exception of the cheerful category, the within-mood transitions are
very close to the empirical data. In short, the modeled network resembles the empirical
network.
3.3. Novel predictions: Task performance
After having developed a rumination model by adapting the memory structure (i.e.,
thought patterns) on which it operates, we can examine how it performs on a cognitive
task. In the data reported by Wigman et al. (2015), depressed participants reported having
significantly more difficulty in concentrating than healthy controls (t(4098.8) = 44.1,
p < 2.2 9 1016).1 Consequently, we predicted that the rumination model would exhibit
an impairment in performance on a sustained attention task that is typically used to mea-
sure mind-wandering, and that it would be distracted more frequently. Fig. 4a shows that
performance on a sustained attention to response task was worse for the depressed rela-
tive to the control model (t(196.5) = 2.2, p = 0.03). A potential reason for this decline in
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performance is an increase in the amount of off-task thinking (Fig. 4b, although this
change in off-task thinking was not statistically significant, t(197.8) = 0.53, p = .60).
There is also no significant difference in the coefficient of variation of response time
(b)
(a)
Fig. 3. Transitions between different moods. (a) Difference between control and depressed networks in
empirical data from Wigman et al. (2015) on the basis of regression coefficients. (b) Modeled network differ-
ence between depressed and control participants on the basis of transition probabilities. Green: control >
depressed. Red: depressed > control.
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(Fig. 4c; t(195.1) = 1.39, p = .17), which is considered to be a sensitive index of off-task
thinking.
4. Discussion
In summary, we have developed a novel approach to modeling psychopathology by
means of cognitive architectures. We structured the model’s memory on the basis of
experience sampling data. We then used our existing mind-wandering model to make pre-
dictions for how performance on a sustained attention task would be impacted by rumina-
tion. We found that merely by modifying the structure and contents of the model’s
memory, we were able to produce retrieval frequencies and sequences similar to what
was observed in the experience sampling study. In addition, our model predicted impair-
ments on a sustained attention task, in line with subjective reports of depressed patients
of difficulty with concentration (Lyubomirsky et al., 2003).
While the model’s performance was qualitatively in line with the observations from
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2003), we were not able to fit the exact patterns. This failure to fit
could either point at a structural limitation of our individual model, of the general ACT-
R cognitive architecture, or at inaccuracies in the data. It turned out to be very difficult
to “create” cycles of rumination because ACT-R only adapts chunk activation, and not
the associations between chunks, which may be the true habits of thought.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4. Comparison of performance of the control (orange) and rumination (blue) model on a sustained
attention to response (go/nogo) task. The depressed model shows lower accuracy (a) but no difference in the
fraction of mind-wandering (b), or coefficient of variation of response time to correct responses. (c) Error
bars reflect standard error of the mean.
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Another potential reason for this failure is our highly simplified representation of
moods. Previous studies have represented mood in terms of physiology (Dancy, 2013) or
in terms of expectations and desirability of the state of the world (Marsella & Gratch,
2009). Theories focused on physiology will be most suitable for making predictions for
how emotions affect physiological parameters such as cortisol. Theories focusing on
expectations instead could help to explain how a person manages larger-scale goals such
as which one of many actions to perform, but not so much performance on a circum-
scribed cognitive task. In addition to the simplifcation of moods, we also highly simplified
self-report and assumed that the model’s mood was simply the summed activation of its
chunks, without implementing a theory of self-report. Future iterations of our model could
use existing work by, for example, Petrov and Anderson (2005) on extracting self-report
scores from continuous data (in our study the continuous data would be the summed acti-
vations of chunks). This would ensure that the data on self-report is more comparable to
the model results.
Finally, the data used to inform our model could be unrepresentative of the real world.
What argues for this is that the experience sampling data show a positivity facilitation for
healthy controls, instead of a negativity facilitation for depressed patients, which has been
reported more frequently in the literature (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Nevertheless, the
sample size is quite large (almost 200 per group), which makes it unlikely that these are
merely chance fluctuations. A possible reason for these discrepancies is that previous
assertions about facilitation by affective valence are based on laboratory experiments,
whereas experience sampling data are from daily life. This is consistent with previous
work that only shows a small correlation between a tendency to mind-wander in experi-
ence sampling and in the laboratory (Kane et al., 2017; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009).
This study contributes to the nascent field of computational psychiatry (Adams, Huys,
& Roiser, 2016). So far, computational psychiatry involved mostly simple reinforcement
learning models of psychiatric problems (but see Kottlors, Brand, & Ragni, 2012). These
models explain, for example, why patients who suffer from rumination have a decreased
sensitivity to punishment (Whitmer, Frank, & Gotlib, 2012).
The advantage of using cognitive architectures compared to simpler reinforcement
learning theories is that they make it possible to simulate performance on many different
tasks. Moreover, it becomes possible to examine changes in cognitive strategies (the
“software of cognition”) in the same context as changes in mental habits (the “hardware
of cognition,” encoded in synaptic connections in the brain), as we have demonstrated in
this paper. Finally, cognitive architectures can implement verbal theories of rumination
directly and assess their consequences for cognitive processing. While we have only sim-
ulated a single theory of rumination, future work should implement the negative atten-
tional bias and inihibition-deficit hypotheses of rumination as well. Each of these theories
may have slightly different effects on the phenomenology and dynamics of mind-wander-
ing and cognitive task performance. In addition to that, our modeling has focused on an
attention task. Nevertheless, another core problem of depressed patients is a significant
reduction in working memory capacity (Onraedt & Koster, 2014). Future work should
examine how rumination may cause this reduction in working memory capacity (Sari,
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Koster, & Derakshan, 2017). One potential mechanism may be that rumination prevents
rehearsals of stimulus materials in spare moments during the task, a mechanism we have
demonstrated to occur when we induced self-referential processing in healthy participants
(Daamen, van Vugt, & Taatgen, 2016; Taatgen et al., submitted).
Another computational approach that is gaining popularity in the field of depression
research is the modeling of network dynamics (Bernstein, Heeren, & McNally, 2017;
Fried et al., 2016; van Borkulo et al., 2015) of depression symptoms. Similar to our
approach, this approach focuses on the dynamics of depression and rumination. For
example, Cramer et al. (2016) demonstrated that depressed patients had a tendency to
quickly move to a depressed state when only lightly disturbed, whereas control partici-
pants had a more resilient dynamic. In addition, Koster et al. (2015) showed that
increased entropy in rumination/mood scores was predictive of future depressive relapse.
Bernstein et al. (2017) showed that self-reported self-criticism is a crucial component in
generating rumination. However, in contrast to our approach, these studies focus on the
responses to questionnaires, not so much the cognitive mechanisms that generate those.
Consequently, unlike our modeling, these approaches cannot make predictions for impair-
ments on specific cognitive tasks.
A final modeling approach that has been used to understand rumination and depression
is more neuro-biologically oriented. For example, Ramirez-Mahaluf, Roxin, Mayberg,
and Compte (2015) used a spiking neuron network of the anterior cingulate cortex and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to demonstrate how the balance between cognitive and emo-
tional processing may be shifted in people suffering from depression. While their model
validated predictions for patterns of neural activity observed in healthy and depressed
patients, it did not make detailed behavioral predictions.
In summary, we have demonstrated how cognitive architectures can be beneficial in com-
putational psychiatry. Cognitive architectures allow us to implement a cognitive theory of
rumination and make testable predictions about performance on a sustained attention task.
This leads to new avenues for better understanding what the exact mechanisms are that
underlie rumination and depression in general. For example, in line with the idea that habits
of thought are crucial for rumination, recent work (Benoit, Davies, & Anderson, 2016) has
shown that changing thought patterns can reduce future fear-related rumination.
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Appendix
Overview of model parameters that were not at their default
Name Abbreviation Value Default
Retrieval threshold :rt 3.0 0.0
Spread activation from the imaginal buffer :imaginal-action-activation 1.0 0.0
How long the indication that something
visual changed remains active
:visual-onset-span 0.7 0.5
Enable randomness in modules :er t nil
The amount of spreading activation :mas 2 nil
Multiplier to generate retrieval times from activations :rt 0.85 1.0
(continued)
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Table. (continued)
Name Abbreviation Value Default
Noise in activation values :ans 0.13 nil
How long does an attentional shift take? :visual-attention-latency 0 0.085
Utility learning :ul t nil
Noise in utilities :egs 0.1 0
How much retrievals change the activation of memory chunks :bll 0.5 nil
Optimized learning (when set to true, it does
not compute activation for individual memory chunks)
:ol nil t
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